Wicksell at the Bank of Canada by Kevin Clinton
QED
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1087


























JEL classification: E42; E52; E58. 








I  gratefully acknowledge  comments  on  earlier drafts  from  Pierre  Duguay,  Emmanuel 
Carré, Charles Freedman, David Laidler, Marc Lavoie, John Murray, Tom Rymes, and 
Michael Woodford.  
 
The views in the paper are mine alone. Although I worked at the bank for many years, the 








  - 2 - 





Wicksell, writing around the start of the 20
th century, outlined an approach to monetary 
policy strikingly similar to the modern approach, of which the Bank of Canada has been a 
pioneer. Its features include: the overriding objective of price stability (or low inflation); 
an interest rate instrument controlled by the rates on settlement balances at the central 
bank; and a policy rule under which the instrument varies in response to deviations from 
the  objective.  Wicksell’s  natural  rate  of  interest  has  resurfaced  as  the  neutral  rate  in 
mainstream  macroeconomic  models;  and  his  description  of  the  inflation  process  has 
parallels in the modern Phillips curve. Moreover, in a mandate for price stability, one can 
find a logical basis for the independence and accountability of central banks. The paper 
tries to explain why Wicksell’s ideas fell by the wayside for a century, and describes how 
the Bank of Canada, by pragmatic steps in the 1990s, helped reinvent Wicksell, and 
install a neo-Wicksellian monetary policy. 
 
 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly supposed Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else … Not indeed immediately, but after a certain interval. 
 
John Maynard Keynes, 1936 
The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money 
1.  Introduction 
This  paper  highlights  striking  similarities  between  modern  monetary  policy  and  the 
writings of Knut Wicksell, 100 years ago.
1  It relates, in particular, how the Bank of 
Canada adopted a neo-Wicksellian approach to monetary policy. Since the bank led the 
way for many other central banks, and since the approach has had wide success, the story 
has broad, international relevance.  
 
Anyone following monetary policy will be familiar with the main features of the modern 
regime. The remarkable parallels with Wicksell are indicated in the following table.   
                                                 
1 Woodford (2003) also draws out these similarities. Woodford takes the theory much further, using inter-
temporal optimization and rational expectations.    
 
 
  - 3 - 
 
 
Monetary policy parallels 
Conduct  Wicksell  Modern or  
neo-Wicksellian 
Objective  stable price level  low inflation or price stability 
Canada: 2% target 
Instrument  commercial bank interest rate    short-term interbank rate 
Canada: overnight rate 
Implementation keystone   central  bank  discount  and 
deposit rates 
central bank discount rate and 
deposit rate 
Canada: bank rate and deposit 
rate 
Policy rule  adjust interest rate in response 
to  actual  deviations  from 
objective 
adjust interest rate in response 
to  actual  and  anticipated 
deviations from objective 
System     
Banking  pure  credit  system—no  bank 
reserves 
zero reserve requirement 
Axis of  monetary 
transmission mechanism 
commercial  bank  rate  relative 
to  natural  (neutral)  interest 
rate 
short-term  rate  relative  to 
natural (neutral) interest rate 
Inflation/deflation gap  unobservable  gap  between 
demand and potential output 
unobservable  gap  between 
demand and potential output 
 
Wicksell published Interest and Prices, his most comprehensive statement on monetary 
policy, in 1898.
2 With the possible exception of the Swedish Riksbank in the 1930s, no 
central bank has deliberately used this work to design a policy regime. Yet by pragmatic 
steps, central bankers adopted a set of measures that they could have found in Wicksell.  
 
At the Bank of Canada, John Crow, then a new Governor, announced a commitment to 
price stability in 1988. Reserve requirements were phased out in the early 1990s. The 
bank adopted the overnight interest rate as policy instrument in 1994, and revamped its 
operating framework for controlling this rate around the rates on settlement accounts in 
1999. The stepwise installation of Wicksell was complete by the end of the century. 
Many other central banks adopted similar measures at about the same time.  
 
The story in the paper starts, in section 2, by trying to explain why the Wicksellian 
approach,  which  would  have  conceivably  avoided  the  disastrous  monetary  policy 
mistakes of the 20
th century, fell by the wayside for so long. The conclusion is that this 
was just bad luck—accidents of country, language and of competing monetary doctrines. 
Section 3 describes the extent to which Wicksell anticipated the broad outline, and many 
if  not  all  key  details,  of  the  current  monetary  policy  model.  Advances  in  economic 
science may have modified components, but the structure remains intact. Section 4 looks 
at  several  issues  that  preoccupied  Wicksell—business  cycles,  the  Quantity  Theory  of 
Money, price indexes, countercyclical monetary policy—and which provide a sidelight 
on  the  evolution  of  thinking.  Section  5  is  about  the  framework  for  the  conduct  of 
                                                 
2 The Wicksell items in the table are all from this book, except the third, which is in a 1917 essay.  
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policy—the definition of central bank responsibility, and of the price stability objective, 
and the mechanism for interest rate control—focusing on the Bank of Canada in the 
1990s. Concluding thoughts are in section 6. 
2.  One hundred years of solitude 
Puzzling loss—and reinvention 
The sentences omitted, in the passage from Keynes at the top, famously go: “Practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist … some academic scribbler of few years 
back.”  These playful lines do not help at all for understanding the disappearance and 
reinvention of Wicksell’s monetary policy. 
 
First,  there  are  a  lot  more  than  a  few  years  to  explain.  Second,  Wicksell  was  never  
defunct.  He  was  the  founder  of  the  Swedish  school  of  economics,  and  recognized 
internationally by peers in his own and following generations for contributions in various 
fields of economics.
3  Nor was he a mere scribbler. He wrote clearly and concisely, and is 
still readable today. He was among the first to use the term monetary policy. He was 
notorious  in  Sweden  for  his  radicalism.
4  Although  this  may  not  have  helped  his 
credibility in central banking circles, Wicksell’s influence was evident in the Riksbank’s 
adoption of a price stability goal in the 1930s—which, given the circumstances, went 
relatively well (Jonung, 1979).  
 
Third, many central bankers acknowledge intellectual influences. Every Governor of the 
Bank of Canada has had a keen interest in economics; the bank speaks proudly of its 
intellectual assets; and it has long cultivated academic connections. More to the point, 
many bank veterans have been aware of Wicksell, and at least one actually read Interest 
and  Prices.  Despite this  familiarity,  there  was  no  conscious  reference  to  the  original 
author as the bank groped towards a neo-Wicksellian regime in the 1990s.   
 
Other central banks, under similar circumstances, followed the same path, at about the 
same time.
5 In the 1990s, the practitioners, often borrowing from each other, assembled a 
new paradigm for monetary policy, unconscious that they were reinventing Wicksell. 
 
Outrageous fortune 
                                                 
3 The Swedish school included Karl Gustav Cassel, Bertil Ohlin and Gunnar Myrdal. Outside Sweden, 
Lionel  Robbins  and  James  Buchanan  acknowledged  Wicksell’s  influence  (biographies  in  The  Concise 
Encyclopedia of Economics.) Since the 1960s, David Laidler and Axel Leijonhufvud have been his main 
torch bearers. 
4 A Malthusian, his forecasts for the economy and population in the 20
th century were as gloomy as they 
were wrong (Part V, Selected Essays). Wicksell worried about sex and alcohol and the working class; he 
was an advocate of birth control. The latter does not shock any more, but it is startling to read, first, that 
Sweden  was  on  the  verge  of  overpopulation  in  the  early  1900s,  and,  second,  that  the  solution  was 
emigration to Siberia, of all places (pp 160-1). In 1910 he spent 2 months in jail for a satire on the 
Immaculate Conception. Wicksell’s foibles in no way diminish the man; rather they reflect his intellectual 
honesty and courage. 
5 For example, Alan Blinder, former Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, cites Wicksell once, for 
the idea of a neutral interest rate (Blinder, 1998).  
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What accounts for the loss of Wicksell’s monetary policy for so long? 
 
A large part of the explanation—there may be no other—lies in intertwined accidents of 
geography, language, and intellectual history. The successful experiment in Sweden in 
the 1930s did not make the waves that an application in a large economy might have 
done. Wicksell wrote mainly in German and Swedish. He published only a couple of 
articles in English, which may be the necessary language to establish a big new idea in 
political economy.  
 
As for intellectual history, Wicksell’s ideas had to compete with 2 potent alternatives, 
Keynesianism and monetarism, as well as their extraordinarily persuasive advocates. The 
English translation of Interest and Prices appeared—10 years after the author’s death—in 
1936. Could timing be worse? Keynes was grabbing all the attention—and did so for 
decades to come. 
 
The  post-World  War  II  consensus,  among  economists  and  central  bankers  alike, 
downgraded  the  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy,  and  assumed  that  it  should  share 
responsibility  (as  a  junior  partner)  with  fiscal  policy,  for  a  comprehensive  list  of 
macroeconomic goals. Its view of monetary policy instruments was just as diffuse—in 
addition to regular bank reserve management, there were variable reserve requirements 
and liquidity ratios, direct credit controls, interest rate controls and other actions to affect 
the  entire  term  structure  of  interest  rates,  debt  management,  and  so  on—with  much 
emphasis  on  institutional  particulars.
6  By  the  early  1960s  conventional  ideas  about 
monetary  policy  were  as  blurred  as  they  would  ever  get.  This  vagueness  created  an 
intellectual appetite for something more solid, and Harry Johnson (1971) describes how 
Friedman’s monetarist counter-revolution hit the spot for many young academics. 
 
In the 1970s, the loose thinking was exposed in practical terms, as inflation accelerated 
and economic performance in general deteriorated, and monetary policy seemed to have 
no answer. Major central banks, including the Bank of Canada, turned to money supply 
targets for backbone. 
 
Wicksell lost opportunities here—he had no Milton Friedman to promote his distinctive 
approach to policy. (David Laidler and Axel Leijonhufvud, the pre-eminent authorities on 
Wicksell, focused more on the theory than the policy.) Until Woodford (2003), there was 
no  clear  recognition  from  economists  that  Wicksell  offered  a  complete  package. 
Keynesians had doubts about the very effectiveness of monetary policy—and did not in 
any case want a single, price stability, objective. Modern Quantity Theorists favoured the 
price stability objective, but not the rest of the Wicksellian regime, e.g. discretionary 
                                                 
6 For conventional views see the Report of the Commission on Money and Credit (1961) in the United 
States, and the Radcliffe Report (1959) in the United Kingdom. Harry Johnson (1962) surveyed the field. 
Although renowned for lucid syntheses, Johnson could not distil a clear message as to what monetary 
policy was about. In Canada, the Porter Commission Report (1964) was more concrete. However, in its 
submissions  to  Porter,  the  Bank  of  Canada,  declining  invitations  to  be  specific,  stuck  to  the  mantra 
“appropriate credit conditions.”  
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Monetarist/rational expectations theorists reinforced the antipathy towards the interest 
rate as an instrument. Who could judge what interest rate level was appropriate? Are 
actual rate movements were real, or just nominal, or some combination? An influential 
attack, by Sargent and Wallace (1975), proved that whereas their money supply rules 
were consistent with stable rational expectations equilibrium, their interest rate rules were 
not. A small difficulty was that their rules excluded feedback from the price level, or any 
other  endogenous  variable  (Woodford,  2002).  This  was  easily  overlooked,  and  the 
Sargent-Wallace  argument  dominated  respectable  monetary  theory  for  a  couple  of 
decades.  
 
Central banks nevertheless persisted with the interest rate, for many years so ineffectively 
that it looked as though Sargent-Wallace might be right. However, they got better at it, 
and eventually, in the 1990s, showed that the interest rate instrument could work. Theory 
bends to facts: before the end of the decade the interest rate staged a friendly takeover of 
policy rules in mainstream models.  
 
If the academics were otherwise preoccupied all these years, what excuses central bank 
neglect  of  Wicksell?    Central  bankers  should  have  been  attentive  from  the  outset. 
Wicksell’s arguments provide a logical justification for delegating monetary policy to an 
independent central bank. Neither Keynesianism nor monetarism is capable of doing so. 
The former would coordinate monetary and fiscal policy, which might be done better 
inside the ministry of finance, while the latter would program a computer to keep M 
growing at a constant rate, and remove all discretion from the central bank. Central bank 
silence  on  Wicksell  is  probably  explained  by  reluctance,  until  the  1990s,  to  assume 
responsibility for anything so transparent.
8  
 
So  it  was  that  nobody  who  counted  on  the  big  stage—no  heavyweight  academic  or 
central banker—went to bat for Wicksell. After Keynes, he was neither for the avant 
garde, nor for practical men. It did not have to be that way. His policy ideas had rigour 
and timeliness, and a directness that makes them easy to explain at any level; and they 
were operational. At various crucial moments, a charismatic advocate, in America or the 
United Kingdom, might have made all the difference. Personalities have always had a 
huge influence on monetary policy. 
 
Although, to this day, Wicksell’s fame remains limited, his ideas have come back by 
wearing  well.  Keynesianism  ran  into  trouble  in  an  economy  operating  near  full-
                                                 
7 Laidler (1972) presents a Wicksellian model, in which the price level is anchored by an interest rate 
feedback rule, which in turn derives from commercial bank cash reserve management. The latter, although 
endogenous, is not explicit, and no cash reserve, or other monetary quantity, appears in the model.  The 
feedback rule could just as well be interpreted as an interest rate policy rule. 
8 In part this was due to the confused state of monetary policy described above, and in part by a penchant 
for  secrecy  (Acheson  and  Chant,  1972).  Since  1990,  the  shift  towards  openness—with  respect  to  the 
instrument, the objective, and everything in between—is remarkable.   
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employment,  and  with  rising  inflation.  Monetarism  rested  on  an  assortment  of 
propositions, which may have had plausibility at the outset, but which soon came undone. 
High  substitutability  among  financial  assets,  and  financial  innovation,  made  the  link 
between  money  stocks  and  nominal  objectives  much  looser  than  monetarists  had 
estimated. In the end the effectiveness in practical terms of the neo-Wicksellian approach, 
or what Bernanke et al (1998) call constrained discretion, completely undermined the 
monetarist critique of discretionary policy.  Its success in maintaining low inflation, with 
vibrant growth of output and employment, in the face considerable economic shocks, and 
in widely varying economies, has finally put to rest the notion that some predetermined 
growth rate of money supply would do the job better. 
3.  Theory of monetary policy—a comparison  
3.1 Overview 
To  confront  problems  that  can  be  sidestepped  in  the  open-economy  case  Wicksell 
deliberately chose a closed-economy setting,
9  (e.g. pp 111-3).
10 Today’s core model has 
3 equations, often written in terms of deviations from long-run equilibrium values:  
·  aggregate demand function, which in the short run determines the output gap as a 
function  of  the  deviation  between  the  actual  interest  rate  and  the  neutral  rate 
(Wicksell’s natural rate) 
·  Phillips curve, which in the short run, determines deviations of inflation from the 
policy  target  as  a  function  of  the  output  gap
11  (augmenting  for  inflation 
expectations is not necessary if the price stability objective is credible—as seems 
to be the case both now and then) 
·  policy rule, which sets the actual interest rate relative to the equilibrium rate, as a 
function of the deviation of inflation from target (e.g. a Taylor rule or, in the 
bank's Quarterly Projection Model, QPM, an inflation-forecast rule—Armour et 
al, 2002)  
 
Long-run equilibrium is defined by these conditions:  
·  the inflation rate is equal to the target rate (the policy rule is thus the nominal 
anchor for the system) 
·  the output gap is zero 
·  the interest rate is equal to the natural rate, which in turn is the rate at which 
demand is equal to full-employment output 
 
                                                 
9 Under a fixed exchange rate, both the rate of inflation and the domestic interest rate are for all intents and 
purposes exogenous. Wicksell saw that the fundamental monetary questions lie in the “degree of freedom” 
(his expression) for monetary policy in the  n-country system as a whole, not in the n-1 fixed exchange 
rates (p 27, Selected Essays). The small-country model also evades basic issues in floating exchange rate 
mode. For example, currency depreciation may offer a way out of a deflation trap for one country, but not 
for all countries together: at least one has to solve the problem at home.  
10 Page references are to Interest and Prices (1898) unless otherwise noted. 
11  This  is  an  accepted  modern  definition  even  though  Phillips’  original  work  was  on  the  relationship 
between wage changes and unemployment.  
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This model is astonishingly close to Wicksell, following the revolutions and counter-
revolutions, and syntheses and innovations, of the intervening years.  
3.2 Natural interest rate and aggregate demand function 
The rate of interest which would be determined by supply and demand if no use were 
made of money and all lending were effected in the form of real capital goods.  p 102. 
 
This is the first of 2 definitions of the natural interest rate provided by Wicksell in 1898.
12  
Since this one is in terms of aggregate demand and supply, it can be pictured as the rate at 
the  intersection  of  the  down-sloping  IS  curve  and  the  vertical  representing  potential 
output (Blinder, 1998).  
 
Wicksell called the actual rate, at which banks lend and businesses borrow, the bank 
interest rate or the money interest rate. The former may be more convenient, since bank 
rate conveys the idea of a short-term rate managed by a visible hand, and since today 
money rate usually means nominal rate, as opposed to real rate. There is no distinction 
between nominal and interest rates in this discussion as expected inflation is constant.  
 
The bank rate (r) enters the aggregate demand function: 
 
   y =   f( r),  (1) 
 
where y is the natural logarithm of output. The bank rate is not in general equal to the 
natural  rate.  Commercial  banks  administer  bank  rate.  According  to  Wicksell,  the 
influence of “routine and experience” leads them to adjust their lending rates too slowly 
(pp 118-9). The market achieves equality between the bank rate and the natural rate only 
over time. 
    
Wicksell does not make a distinction between actual and potential levels of output. A 
possible interpretation is that Wicksellian demand is unobservable, and that actual output 
is at potential. In modern macroeconomics, in contrast, observed output reflects demand, 
and potential output is unobservable.  
 
In either case, long-run equilibrium is given by 
 
   y
pot =   f (r
n),  (2) 
 
which implicitly determines the natural rate r
n, since y
pot is determined by factors outside 
the model.  
 
Writing the model in terms of deviations from equilibrium, the output gap (actual minus 
potential) is a decreasing function of the interest rate deviation (actual minus natural): 
  
  y – y
po t =  f ( r - r
n).  (3) 
                                                 
12 Laidler (1991) points out that he later added a third: the marginal product of capital (Wicksell, 1907).  
 
 
  - 9 - 
 
This  is the simplest  description  of  the  interest rate  mechanism  that  Wicksell  thought 
drove swings in business activity.
13 
 
Term spread as Wicksell interest rate deviation 
In the early 1990s, findings that the slope of the yield curve was a good predictor of 
short-run  changes  in  GDP  attracted  the  bank’s  attention.  As  a  result,  the  differential 
between a long-term and a short-term interest rate was the monetary policy variable in the 
bank’s workhorse model, QPM, and in bank exchange rate models as well.  
 
Clinton (1994) used Wicksell to explain empirical results from Cozier and Tkacz (1994), 
which  strongly  confirmed  the  predictive  power  of  the  long-short  differential.
14  The 
expected future short-term rate, beyond some horizon, would rationally be equal to the 
natural rate. The consensus estimate of the lag effect of monetary policy suggests that this 
horizon is about one year. The expectations theory would predict, from this, that the 
impact of a shock to the short rate on the long-term bond yield should be quite small (e.g. 
the coefficient of the short rate in an equation for the 20-year rate should be about 1/20 or 
0.05). Estimated impulse-response functions confirmed this. As the converse of the low 
weight on the short rate, the natural rate must have a high weight in the bond yield. 
Therefore  the  long-short  rate  spread  gauges  the  natural-actual  rate  deviation.  The 
predictive power of the spread can be attributed to Wicksell’s interest rate mechanism.  
 
Wicksell had neither the expectations theory nor yield curve data to work with, so he 
could not test his theory in this way.
 His only comment on the term structure was that the 
long rate would be higher than the short rate, and follow the short rate (pp 75, 91-93). 
This is not satisfactory analysis from a modern perspective, as it ignores expectations, 
and hence the implications of the natural rate for the expected future short-term rate. 
3.3 Price level or inflation and output gap  
There is a certain rate of interest which is neutral in respect to commodity prices, and 
tends neither to raise nor to lower them.  p 102. 
 
The  immediate  precondition  and  reason  for  every  change  of  price,  of  any  kind 
whatsoever, and no matter what its ultimate causes might be, is always a disproportion 
that has come into being between the money rate of interest and the natural or real rate 
of interest on capital. 1908, p 35. 
 
The second definition of the natural interest rate is in terms of the price level. The two are 
equivalent, because inflation or deflation results from an imbalance of aggregate demand 
and supply.  
 
                                                 
13 At one point Wicksell argues that in long-run equilibrium bank and natural rates do not have to be equal 
(p 120), but for theoretical purposes one might as well define equilibrium in terms of equality of the 2 rates. 
Interest differentials can be introduced through risk premiums, and a range of longer-term maturities.  
14  Some  bank  economists  adhered  to  a  real-business-cycle  explanation,  in  terms  of  inter-temporal 
reallocations of output and consumption. This does not, however, stand up to scrutiny (Clinton, 1994).  
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 “Easier credit sets up a tendency for production to expand; but [not] … if the available 
means  of  production,  labour  and  so  on,  are  almost  fully  occupied….  the  excess  of 
demand (brought about by easier credit) over supply … is the decisive fact in forcing up 
prices…” (p 90). This thought may be conventional today, but in 1898 the emphasis was 
on the stock of money rather than the flow of spending (Ohlin, 1936). 
 
In  the  light  of  the  behaviour  of  prices  in  the  19
th  century,  Wicksell  understandably 
focuses on long swings, over decades, around a constant long-run average. His careful 
discrete-period  analysis  is  confined  to  static  price  expectations.  Even  within  this 
framework, he is able to describe how a prolonged divergence of the actual interest rate 
from the natural rate leads to a cumulatively rising and eventually an accelerating price 
level (pp 95-8). “The upward movement of prices will in some measure ‘create its own 
draught’.” Informally, he does envisage expectations adjusting upwards, with speculative 
buying:  “as  prices  continue  to  soar  and  profits  are  easily  earned  the  movement  may 
rapidly reach fever point. There is almost no limit to the rise in price.”  
 
This accelerationist view finds an echo in the vertical long-run Phillips curve, an integral 
part of the bank’s thinking since the 1970s (Fortin, 2003).  Wicksell, however, has no 
Phillips curve, and goes directly from interest rate to price level.  We can get an equation 
like that, by substituting the output gap out of the standard modern model. Where p is the 
natural logarithm of the price level, the Phillips curve is  
 
  Dp = g ( y - y
po t ).   
 
Substituting from equation 3 for the output gap yields: 
 
  Dp = h ( r - r
n).  (4) 
 
On the surface, equation 4 corresponds to Wicksell’s statements of the inflation process. 
Some qualification, however, is in order. Since the output gap fluctuates at business cycle 
frequency, equation 4 does not describe the lower frequency inflation/deflation cycles 
that  intrigued  Wicksell.  To  update  his  concerns,  we  should  be  explaining  the  low 
inflation of the 1950s and 60s, the stagflation of the 1970s and 80s, and the low inflation 
of the 1990s and 2000s. Output gaps help in this context only for transition phases. Today 
we point to shifts in expectations to explain lasting changes in the price level or inflation 
environment,  and  we  have  various  tractable  hypotheses  within  mainstream  theory.  In 
contrast,  techniques  100  years  ago  were  not  up  to  endogenous  evolution  of  price 
expectations.  
3.4 Policy rules 
So long as prices remain unaltered the banks’ rate of interest is to remain unaltered. If 
prices rise, the rate of interest us to be raised; and if prices fall, the rate of interest is to 
be lowered; and the rate if interest is henceforth to be maintained at its new level until a 
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Although discretion and judgment are intrinsic to the conduct of monetary policy, central 
bank  economists  have  been  avid  students  of  policy  rules  (e.g.  Armour  et  al,  2002). 
Wicksell’s rule was the first; it may be written: 
 
  Dr =  g  Dp.   (5) 
 
 
We may compare equation 5 to the famous Taylor rule: 
   
  r - r
n =  g (Dp – 0.02) +  f ( y – y
po t).  (6)  
 
Taylor thought the numerical approximation g  = f  = 0.5 described actual Fed policy in 
the 1980s and 90s quite well. For modeling purposes the target may be set at an arbitrary 
level. For practical purposes, 2% is obviously relevant—whether it is the right level is a 
question taken up in section 5. 
 
The above quotation and the equation say that policy should target just the inflation rate 
going forward, such that any errors have a permanent effect on the price level. On the 
face of it, the Wicksell rule seems designed to stabilize the inflation rate rather than the 
price level. Going forward, the price level would not have finite variance. Thus while the 
rule  may  be  appropriate  for  inflation  targeting,  it  does  not  seem  consistent  with  an 
objective of price stability. 
 
Woodford (2003), however, argues that for shocks to the natural rate, the Wicksell policy 
rule would constrain the price level to finite variance, because the natural rate itself is 
bounded. But even in this case, Wicksell’s rule would behave for all intents and purposes 
like an inflation rule. Consider a single shock to the natural rate: prices change; following 
the Wicksell rule, the actual interest rate homes onto the natural rate. Once at the new 
equilibrium, prices stay constant until the next shock to the natural rate. Given the long-
swings that Wicksell envisaged, prices could be displaced for decades before a shock to 
the natural rate sends them back towards the original level. In the very long run, repeated 
disturbances of this kind would average out, and the rule would ensure that prices would 
fluctuate around a given level. But in real time it would not look as though the central 
bank was stabilizing prices around any particular level.  
 
To put the point another way, the adaptive rule in equation 5 would not be an efficient 
one,  for  either  an  inflation  target  or  price  stability.
15    If  the  central  bank  has  any 
information about the natural rate, about the output gap, or about the Phillips curve, it can 
design a more effective rule. 
 
Wicksell’s rule “does not mean that banks ought actually to ascertain the natural rate. 
That  would,  of  course  be  impractical,  and  would  also  be  quite  unnecessary.  For  the 
current level of commodity prices provides a reliable test of the agreement or diversion of 
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the two rates.” (p 189). Economists today, however, are prepared to take a stab at the 
natural rate. There is more confidence in measurement, which reflects improvements in 
theory, quantitative technique, and data. Blinder (1998) describes 2 methods employed at 
the Fed: solving a complete macroeconomic model; and computing long-run averages of 
actual rates. Other measures may be derived from the growth rate of potential output, or 
from long-term bond yields.  
 
Bank  of  Canada  modelers  have  investigated  inflation-targeting  rules  in  numerous 
variants. They have focused particularly on inflation-forecast-based rules. Econometric 
findings on the lag effect have had a detectable impact here. For example, the QPM 
reaction function set the short-term interest rate so as to eliminate any current or potential 
deviation of inflation from target over a horizon of 6-8 quarters (Armour et al, 2002).  
 
In practical terms, the background documents for the 1991 announcement of inflation 
targets  refer  to  a  forward-looking  approach  (Freedman,  1996);  and  the  6-8  quarter 
horizon is explicit in the bank’s routine explanations of interest rate decisions.  
 
The theoretical pay-off from refinements to the policy rule is a reduction in the variance 
of  inflation  or  output.  But  the  substantial  margins  of  error  in  measurements  of 
unobservables,  in  models,  and  in  coefficient  estimates,  mean  that  such  a  gain  is  not 
guaranteed. Moreover, the Bank of Canada uses the core inflation rate to calibrate its 
estimate of potential output; an unexpected change in the rate of any significance would 
soon lead to a revised estimate of potential. This iterative feedback means that inflation 
itself in the end dominates the policy rule, and in effect brings us back to something very 
close to Wicksell.  
4.  Sidelights 
4.1 Business cycles 
All these difficulties and complications at once disappear when it is changes, brought 
about by independent factors, in the natural rate of interest on capital, that are regarded 
as the essential cause of such movements.   p 167. 
 
Wicksell explains his theory of business and price fluctuations by considering how a  
variety  of  shocks  might  affect  the  economy.  These  include  exogenous  changes  to 
productivity, to the supply of credit or the bank rate, the money supply, and the wage 
level. He examines his theory against all the cases. Much debate with his contemporaries 
involved  consideration  of  a  novel  hypothetical  disturbance.
16  Wicksell  argued  about 
hypothetical shocks of all shapes and colours. 
 
Even so, “The main cause of the business cycle, and a sufficient cause, seems to be the 
fact that technical and commercial progress cannot by its very nature give rise to a series 
which proceeds as evenly as the growth in time of human needs.” (Cited by Ohlin, p ix.) 
Movements in the natural rate of interest are, then, the prime mover. 
                                                 
16 Professor David Davidson would often set Wicksell off.  
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This may read like late-20
th century real-business cycle theory—but just until Wicksell 
brings lagged adjustment of the interest rate into the picture. In new classical theory you 
do not find this: “There is nothing so far to bring the rate of interest on money into 
coincidence with the rate which would be determined if capital goods were lent in kind ” 
(p xxvi, Wicksell’s italics)—or this: “… there is no reason for any rapid movement of the 
money rate into line with the natural rate, and a deviation between the two rates, with its 
dues effect on prices, can persist for a considerable time” (p xxvii). 
 
His insistence on slow adjustment of the interest rate is all the more significant in the 
light  of  the  decades-long  swings  on  which  he  focused.  Wicksellian  cycles  are  of  a 
distinctly lower frequency than those in modern business cycle theory. 
 
Another difference is that Wicksell’s particular emphasis on natural rate shocks has not 
been taken up. Modern macroeconomic models are routinely subjected to an array of 
experimental disturbances. Shocks to investment demand, or to potential output, could in 
principle lead to changes in the neutral interest rate in these models, but typically the 
modelers do not centre their analysis on this.
17  
4.2 Moderating cycles 
[Measures]  that are apt to ensure that money retains a constant value are likely to be, at 
the same time, a means of stabilizing, not disturbing  the steady course of business life. 
1908  p 36. 
 
The Bank of Canada has also repeatedly made this argument. For example, Freedman 
(1996) argues that the policy response to persistent demand shocks under a symmetric 
inflation target is countercyclical. In more general terms, recent bank governors have 
underlined this attribute of the regime (e.g. Dodge 2002).  
 
On  this  argument,  which  Blanchard  and  Gali  (2005)  label  the  “divine  coincidence,” 
inflation control is useful not just in itself but as a means to a more stable economy. In 
the  consensus  macro  model,  an  inflation-control  target  requires  discretionary 
management to stabilize the cycle. 
4.3 Quantity Theory 
The Quantity Theory is theoretically valid so long as the assumption of ceteris paribus is 
firmly adhered to. But among the “things” that have to be supposed to remain “equal” 
are  some  of  the  flimsiest  and  most  intangible  factors  in  the  whole  of  economics—in 
particular the velocity of circulation of money.   p 42. 
 
                                                 
17 Duguay (1994) specifies an aggregate demand function in first differences, which could imply a non-
stationary natural rate of interest. The new neoclassical model Goodfriend and King (1998), which could be 
interpreted  as a Wicksellian model, has an endogenous natural rate. But these authors, like other modern 
authors, do not feature movements in the natural rate as the centrepiece of their analysis.  
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Classification  is  not  necessary.  However,  since  Wicksell  associated  himself  with  the 
Quantity Theory, it is necessary for clarity to disassociate him from the Modern Quantity 
Theory—as per Friedman’s restatement—and monetarism.
18  
 
For Wicksell the demand for money, or velocity, is not stable or predictable. And the 
supply  of  money  is  not  pinned  down  by  exogenous  factors.  One  of  his  imaginative 
devices is a pure credit economy, in which the money supply is indefinitely elastic (pp 
62-80).  It  helped  him  to  explain  why  the  supply  of  money  was  not  closely  linked 
empirically  to  a  monetary  base.  More  fundamentally,  in  the  pure  credit  economy, 
monetary policy can stabilize the price level using the interest rate. Wicksell had no need 
to pursue the point, but it is implicit in his theory that policy is set without reference to a 
monetary  quantity.  His  pure  credit  system  is  a  good  enough  description  of  the  21
st 
century  model,  with  near-zero  bank  reserves,  and  central  bank  control  of  short-term 
interest rates. 
 
If  it  matters,  one  could  argue  that  Wicksell’s  insistence  on  the  interest  rate  channel 
transmission mechanism is more Keynesian than monetarist: “… the explanation offered 
by the Quantity Theory—that rising prices are due to an excess of money, falling prices 
to a scarcity—does not accord with actually observed movements of the rate of interest 
…” (p 167). 
 
Wicksell’s Quantity Theory is surely no more than monetary neutrality: in steady states, 
if all nominal magnitudes differ by an equal proportional amount, no real variables are 
affected. Conversely, if you control one nominal magnitude, and all real variables remain 
constant, you fix the overall price level. The control variable could be money (p 40); it 
could be something else. These are innocuous thought experiments in a timeless world. 
They imply no particular causality. The equilibrium price level is a neutral equilibrium: 
stable in the way of a cylinder on a plane (pp 100-1): it is not unstable, but it can be 
permanently displaced by many different shocks, real or monetary.
  19 To prevent such 
indeterminacy, the central bank should apply intelligent monetary policy. Wicksell argues 
for  a  watchful  discretionary  management  of  money,  via  the  interest rate. In  contrast, 
under the Modern Quantity Theory, the money stock anchors the price level well enough; 
discretionary policy does more harm than good; and the interest rate is best left alone.  
 
Like  Wicksell,  the  Bank  of  Canada  respects  the  Quantity  Theory  as  statement  of 
principle,  and  as  the  explanation  for  many  historically  important  episodes  of  price 
change.
20 It encourages research into the role of quantities in monetary transmission, in 
conferences and so on. The bank itself invests in models where money matters. These 
                                                 
18 Humphrey (1997) takes a monetarist interpretation of Wicksell, but studiously avoids Wicksell’s denial 
of all the relevant empirical assertions, as well as his advocacy of a discretionary policy. 
19  Wicksell’s  theory  allows  exogenous  changes  in  money  to  have  effects  on  prices.  The  regime  he 
recommended would, however, avoid or counteract them. Laidler (1991) shows how his judgment about 
the empirical importance of money supply disturbances evolved: in 1898 Wicksell thought such events had 
been rare, but he later acknowledged that gold discoveries led to “the much higher price level during the 
decade [sic] 1893-1913” (1915, p 125).  
20 For a similar Bank of England view see King (1992).  
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vary over a wide range, from single equations, to dynamic general equilibrium theory and 
structural  VECMs  (Longworth,  2002).  The  bank  has  unearthed  evidence  that  certain 
monetary aggregates have predictive power not captured by other variables. This research 
diversifies the bank’s portfolio of models, but it has not penetrated actual policy-making 
to any depth. Unpredictable shifts repeatedly undermine confidence in the aggregates. 
Even though the policy-makers receive regular in-depth briefings on money supply, and 
the Monetary Policy Report has a section on money supply, it is notable in the bank’s 
regular  interest  rate  announcements  by  its  absence.  If  money  is  there  at  all,  it  is  to 
reinforce the message in other data.  
 
After all the water under the bridge, present central bank views on the money supply are 
not  so  different  from  Wicksell’s.  In  a  theoretical  long-run  sense  money  is  neutral, 
intrinsically linked one-for-one with the price level. Large changes in money stocks have 
to  be  watched—there  is  always  the  possibility  that  they  might  embody  a  significant 
shock. In a low inflation environment, however, the money-inflation correlation is quite 
weak, and no basis for policy formulation.  
4.4 Price level measurement 
Monetary economists—Irving Fisher and William Stanley Jevons, as well as Wicksell—
made seminal contributions to index number theory, as well as to its practical application. 
Having concluded that general price stability should be the standard, they followed up 
with research to measure movements in the general price level. In the absence of price 
indexes, it was difficult to gauge the size of general price fluctuations, and hence to 
analyze monetary history, a fact which caused Wicksell some frustration.  
 
The Bank of Canada has resumed the monetary tradition of research on price indexes. It 
has  thoroughly  examined  possible  bias  in  the  CPI  (Crawford,  1998).  Its  interest  in 
capturing the underlying trend has stimulated Statistics Canada to produce, in addition to 
the CPI, a series that omits highly volatile items. The bank’s own core inflation rate, 
which  Stat  Can  publishes,  removes  the  effects  of  changes  in  indirect  taxes  from  the 
preceding  (Macklem,  2001).  The  bank’s  close,  ongoing  interest  encourages  the 
production of relevant, high quality data. 
 
Wicksell, we can only imagine, would be amazed and delighted at the headlines and 
analysis in the business pages that follow Stat Can’s monthly CPI release, and, above all, 
at the central bank’s prominent role. 
5.  Framework to conduct monetary policy 
5.1 Who’s in charge? 
Co-operation between the banks of a single country for the regulation of interest rates is, 
already, of course, a matter of everyday procedure. 1898  p 192. 
 
But all of this presupposes that the banks or the authorities in charge of monetary 
administration do actually have the power to regulate the general level of prices.  
1908  p 37.  
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In my opinion [a true central bank] ought, first, to be a purely state  institution.  
1917  p 78.
21 
 
Central bank evolution 
Wicksell was convinced that the interest rate could and should be managed to provide 
price stability, and that this would provide an enormous social benefit. But where did—or 
should—this responsibility rest? The idea that the primary function of the central bank is 
monetary  policy  took  shape  during  Wicksell’s  working  life.
22  Until  the  20
th  century 
conventional thinking saw the gold standard as the best basis for monetary stability. In 
1900,  the  notion  that  intelligent  policy  should  be  used  to  this  end  was  still  just  an 
emerging academic view; by the end of the 1920s circumstances forced central banks in 
this direction, even as they tried to maintain the gold standard.  
 
Wicksell  was  prominent  in,  and  influenced  by,  the  development  of  modern  central 
banking:  his  early  writings  are  vague  on  the  location  of  responsibility  for  monetary 
policy; his later writings pin it down. 
 
Thus, in 1898 Wicksell is after co-operation between the banks, and in 1908, the banks or 
the authorities in charge of monetary administration. In 1917, when he settled on the 
central bank—which was to be an institution for government policy, and not the uneasy 
private/state blend of the day—he was a few years ahead of the crowd.  But it took 
another 70 years to establish price stability, or low inflation, as the overriding objective. 
In retrospect, this is passing strange, because this objective provides a logical basis for 
central bank independence. 
 
In the 21
st century, most central banks have a price stability mandate, or some facsimile. 
Modern concerns about central bank governance—mandate, independence, relationship 
with the government, accountability—reflect further progress in a direction that Wicksell 
started.  
 
Bank of Canada evolution 
In Canada, legislated responsibilities have changed remarkably little since the Bank of 
Canada was established in 1934. The only reform in this regard came in the wake of the 
Coyne  Affair.  Prior  to  becoming  Governor,  in  1962,  Louis  Razminsky  insisted  on  a 
clarification of the responsibilities of government and central bank, which was put into 
the  revision  of  the  Bank  of  Canada  Act  in  1967.  The  government  is  ultimately 
responsible  for  monetary  policy,  and  in  the  event  of  an  irreconcilable  difference  the 
Minister of Finance may send a public, written, directive to the Governor specifying the 
                                                 
21 The context is an argument for a Scandinavian monetary union. 
22 The Swedish central bank is a good example. The Riksbank had been primarily a state commercial bank 
until the late 1890s, when it assumed public responsibilities of the kind the Bank of England had had for 
decades, e.g. lender of last resort (Riksbank website, history pages). In this sense, the Riksbank became a 
central bank not far ahead of the Federal Reserve System or, for that matter, the Bank of Canada. If the 
essence is monetary policy, as we may be inclined to think today, central banks proper first emerged in the 
1920s and 1930s.  
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action the bank must take, and the timing. The directive power, in effect, strengthens the 
operational independence and accountability of the bank.
23 It ties the government to the 
Bank of Canada’s conduct of monetary policy; ministers cannot criticize when they can 
command.
24  At  the  same  time,  it  imposes  an  obligation  on  the  bank  to  provide 
information about its actions to the government, for which routine processes have been 
established.  It  also  implies  a  less  formal,  but  no  less  important,  requirement  for 
accountability about monetary policy vis-à-vis the general public. 
 
No legislative reform, however, has had nearly as much practical import as the efforts of 
John Crow, Governor between 1987 and 1994, to strengthen monetary policy and the role 
of the central bank.  
 
The Governor would have liked a price stability objective in the Bank of Canada Act.
25 In 
its absence, for guidance to the policy mandate, he studied the preamble, a concoction of 
good  intentions,  with  the  provision  “so  far  as  may  be  possible  through  the  scope  of 
monetary action.” The latter was one blade of the dialectic scissors Crow would wield. 
Furthermore,  the  Act  gives  the  Bank  of  Canada  considerable  independence—to  what 
purpose?  Second blade: there has to be an objective that needs shielding from routine 
politics. The scissors cut away the superfluous from the preamble, to reveal the thing 
itself, unaccommodated price stability. No other objective made sense.  
 
At first the rhetoric sounded shocking, but in 1991 the objective of price stability was 
embodied  in  the  inflation-reduction  targets,  which  many  economists  regard  as  the 
beginning of inflation targeting in Canada. The stability objective was defined as a rate of 
inflation “clearly below 2 percent.” By virtue of John Crow, Wicksell moved into the 
Bank of Canada in an operational way. Although the objective was soon modified, the 
focus on a single, price level, objective has remained. 
 
A notable feature of the Canadian targets is their joint announcement by the bank and the 
government, confirming that the Bank of Canada helps set the objective, and is not just 
an agency to that end.  
 
Central banks are a work in progress. Their monetary policy function is not old. The 
modalities are not carved in stone. Debate goes on about the mandate, about low inflation 
versus price stability, and other such subjects. Political events and the local environment 
embellish the facade and affect the plumbing of every central bank. But underlying all 
this is a common structure for which Wicksell drew a blueprint.  
5.2 Price stability or low inflation 
The ideal position, affording common advantage to the overwhelming majority of the 
various groups of interest would undoubtedly be one in which, without interfering with 
                                                 
23 Some academics get this wrong, e.g. in calibrating an  “index of central bank independence.” 
24 Compare the situation in the United States, where Secretaries of the Treasury do not hesitate to urge the 
Fed to loosen up. 
25 For Crow’s views we can rely on his lively memoir Making Money.  
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the inevitable variations in the relative price of commodities, the general average level of 
prices—in so far as this conception can be assigned a definite meaning …—would be 
perfectly invariable and stable. 1898 p 4. 
 
This quotation could be from John Crow. The Governor and Wicksell are both price-
stability hardliners, and both have an engaging turn of phrase. “Those people who prefer 
a continually upward moving to a stationary price level forcibly remind one of those who 
purposely keep their watches a little fast so as to be more certain of catching their trains.” 
(p  3).  Wicksell’s  distaste  for  inflation  was  reinforced  by  his  view  that  it  created 
speculative excesses, and hence crises, which would trigger slump and deflation (p 213).  
 
Wicksell expresses dislike of inflation and deflation—that Crow has less to say against 
the latter you can put down to the difference in environment. To reinforce their case, both 
men emphasize the ethics as well as the economics of a commitment to price stability. 
 
At the end of 1993, the new Liberal government wanted to replace the price stability 
objective with a 1-to-3 percent inflation target of indefinite duration. Crow could not 
accept this much water in the wine, and so did not seek reappointment to a second term.
26 
To be precise about the date, inflation targeting in Canada starts in February 1993, with 
the  arrival  of  Gordon  Thiessen  as  Governor.  Since  then,  Canada  has  aimed  at  2% 
inflation.
27  The  most  recent  restatement  of  the  objective  (2001)  allows  that,  after  10 
years’ experience with low inflation, the bank does not see clear gains from a lower 
target. A new statement is due in 2006. 
 
The Bank of Canada, uniquely, has intensively studied and debated the implications of 
using the price level as a policy objective rather than the inflation rate.
28  Whereas the 
consensus  (e.g.  Fischer,  1994)  dismisses  a  price  level  objective,  fearing  high  output 
volatility and deflation risk, the bank’s research suggests the case is not closed. A slightly 
rising target level (it could be 2% p.a.), and an appropriately smooth policy rule (i.e. a 
longish target horizon), would deal with the main objections.
29 Because it has memory, a 
credible price level objective would be an effective solution to a deflation trap: a price 
decline would require, and create expectations of, a spurt of inflation.  
 
In any event, the adoption of low inflation as the objective, rather than price stability, 
stands  out  as  the  main  difference  between  Wicksell  and  neo-Wicksellian  monetary 
policy. 
                                                 
26 Crow also detected a subtle erosion of the authority of the bank, which he thought should be more than 
an agency pursuing a numerical objective set by the government. 
27 This maximizes the probability that the outcome will be in the official 1-3% range. 
28 Duguay (1994a) and Coulombe (1997) provide original ideas and excellent discussions. 
29  The  issue  is  between  a  trend-stationary  process  (finite  variance  around  the  trend)  and  a  non-trend-
stationary  process  (unbounded  variance).  Finite  variance  in  the  price  level  has  obvious  virtues  over 
unbounded variance if a nominal anchor is important.  
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5.3 Instrument—framework for interest rate control 
[The central bank] …could set a rate of interest on deposits that was only very slightly 
lower, or preferably no lower at all than the rate of interest the bank itself asked … I see 
no real reason for the traditional state of affairs, in many places fixed by law, according 
to which central banks ought not to grant any interest on deposits. 1917 p 78. 
 
In keeping with his focus on the interest rate as a policy instrument, and with his pure 
credit  banking  model,  by  1917  Wicksell  came  to  recommend  a  method  of  policy 
implementation  based  on  the  deposit  and  discount  rates  of  the  central  bank.  He  was 
concerned  that  the  operating  framework,  rudimentary  as  it  then  was,  did  not  allow 
sufficient policy influence over interest rates.  
 
His  recommendation  was  to  ensure  closer  interest  rate  control  was,  again,  very  far-
sighted. For most of the 20
th century, central bankers and academics instead highlighted 
reserve requirements, liquidity ratios, and reserve supply. Legal minimum requirements 
forced banks to hold zero-interest reserves at the central bank. Changes in the supply of 
reserves, relative to the requirement, were the instrument. The ability of the central bank 
to control the level of its liabilities—liquidity provision—was the key operating variable. 
Interest rates went wherever they had to go, as a consequence of, as John Crow would 
say, an appropriate pace of monetary expansion.  
 
In the early 1990s, Canada, along with many countries, phased out reserve requirements. 
The fractional reserve model obviously no longer applies—banking systems are, in the 
21
st century, pure credit systems.  
 
In 1994 the Bank of Canada first announced a 50-basis point wide operating band for the 
overnight money market interest rate. In the 1999 re-fit of the operating framework, for 
the  new  electronic  Large  Value  Transfer  System,  the  bank  started  to  pay  interest  on 
settlement  balances.  The  latter  provides  a  floor  for  the  overnight  interest  rate  in  the 
money market, just as in Wicksell’s description. At the top end, the lending rate of the 
central bank—Bank Rate in Canada, discount rate in Wicksell—provides the ceiling This 
arrangement allows the central bank to control the short-term interest rate within fine 
tolerances (Clinton, 1997;  Howard, 1998).  
 
Central banks used to give abstruse signals about monetary policy through the provision 
of  bank  reserves,  which  specialized  economist-scribblers  would  demystify  for  the 
masses.
30 These quantities no longer have any policy significance at all. 
6.  Concluding thoughts 
So far that it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty if and when changes in the 
purchasing power of money have occurred in reality, we have acquired an objective basis 
for attempts to prevent such changes by rational methods. It has to be admitted that even 
then, it is no easy task that lies before the combined forces of economic science and 
economic practice; but provided only the theorists are done with their part of the task, 
                                                 
30 Foe example, Clinton (1991).   
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the practitioners will surely find ways to apply their teachings—to the extent, that is, that 
they are forced to do so by necessity.  1902  p 31. 
 
Before Keynes, Wicksell came to the conclusion that the central bank could stabilize the 
value of money, and that it should do so. Since money is a social contrivance, it makes 
little sense to leave its value to the vagaries of gold production and commercial banking, 
and so on. There has to be a way of managing money that improves on this. 
 
Such thoughts broke open the idea of monetary policy. With uncanny timing, Wicksell 
worked during the hey-day of the gold standard, and his thinking was ready to apply just 
before that system ran into terminal trouble. The recommendations—for stabilizing the 
price level, for the framework of implementation, and for a policy rule—are practical and 
unambiguous, less open to interpretation than Keynes, and useful with little modification 
in a wide range of situations. 
 
Wicksell’s optimism that policymakers would soon adopt his proposals was reasonable, 
given their relevance and the quality of his argument. That the major central banks did 
not appreciate their merit was a huge lost opportunity. Wicksell’s approach would have 
been a vast improvement when it really counted, during the Great Depression of the 
1930s, and the Great Inflation of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Wicksell’s conception of monetary policy—intelligent management of the interest rate 
for price stability—captures Crow, Thiessen, Dodge, Greenspan, Bernanke, and all. After 
more than a decade we have enough information to start judging performance. The results 
so far look good in comparison to the preceding regimes. And, since no alternative is 
apparent, the neo-Wicksell regime looks set to last. After a century of trial and error, 
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